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Kingsley and Martin: Taxation

TAXATION
I. STARKER II: NONRECOGNITION OF LIKE-KIND
EXCHANGES IS STRETCHED TO NEW LIMITS

A.

INTRODUCTION

In Starker v. United States (Starker II),· the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals addressed a myriad of significant issues relating to nonrecognition treatment under section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code).2 Of primary importance to the tax
practitioner, the court approved delayed three-corner exchanges. 3
The court also held that a contract right to land is a like-kind
exchange for real property regardless of the possibility that cash
might be received by the taxpaper.4
B.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On April 1, 1967, along with his son and daughter-in-law,
Bruce and Elizabeth Starker, T. J. Starker entered into a land
exchange agreement with Crown Zellerbach (Crown). Pursuant
to the agreement, the Starkers agreed to convey to Crown all
their interests in 1,843 acres of timberland in Columbia County,
Oregon. In consideration for this timberland, Crown agreed to
buy and transfer to the Starkers other real property in Oregon
and Washington. According to the agreement, Crown was to provide the Starkers with acceptable real property within five years
or pay the outstanding balance in cash. Crown further agreed to
credit a six percent annual "growth factor" to the Starkers' exchange balance. This "growth factor" was based on the exchange
balance remaining on Crown's books at the end of each year.
1. 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. Aug., 1979)(per Goodwin, J.; the other panel members
were Anderson, J. and Jameson, D.J.).
2. I.R.C. §§ 1031(a) (1954) provides as follows:
(a) NONRECOGNITION OF GAIN OR LOSS FROM EX·
CHANGES SOLELY IN KIND-No gain or loss shaH be recognized if property held for productive use in trade or business
or for investment (not including stock in trade or other property held primarily for sale, nor stocks, bonds, notes, choses in
action, certificates of trust or beneficial interest, or other securities or evidences of indebtedness or interest) is exchanged
solely for property of a like kind to be held either for productive use in trade or business or for investment.
3. 602 F.2d at 1353, 1354.
4. [d. at 1355.
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The Starkers deeded their timberland to Crown on May 31,
1967, at which time Crown entered an "exchange value" credit
in its books of $1,502,500 for T. J. Starker and $73,500 for Bruce
and Elizabeth Starker. Within four months, Elizabeth and Bruce
Starker found three suitable parcels of land which were promptly
acquired and conveyed to them by Crown. Since the value of the
transferred property equalled the Starkers' exchange balance of
$73,500, no cash was paid to them. Likewise, no "growth factor"
was added because a year had not expired since the timberland
was deeded to Crown.
Between July, 1967, and May, 1969, T. J. Starker selected
twelve parcels of land. Crown purchased nine of these parcels
from third parties and then transferred them to taxpayer. After
Crown obtained them, two of the remaining parcels, the Timian
and Bi-Mart properties, were conveyed at taxpayers' directions
to his daughter, Jean Roth. The twelfth parcel, the Booth property, involved a third party's contract to purchase. Crown purchased that contract right and reassigned it to T. J. Starker.
In their income tax returns for 1967, all three Starkers
treated the transfers to Crown as nonrecognition transactions
under section 1031 of the Code. The Internal Revenue Service
ruled that the transactions were not tax exempt and assessed
$300,930.31 plus interest against T. J. Starker and $35,248.41
against Elizabeth and Bruce Starker. Taxpayers paid the deficiencies and filed claims for refunds. When the refunds were denied, they filed two actions for refunds in the district court.
In the first action, Starker u. United'States 5 (Starker I), the
court granted Bruce and Elizabeth Starker their refund, thereby
entitling the transaction to nonrecognition treatment. The Government chose not to pursue their appeal, and the appeal was
voluntarily dismissed. The judgment became final.
In Starker u. United States 8 (Starker II), however, the Government vigorously argued that taxpayer was not entitled to
nonrecognition treatment under section 1031. Despite the fact
that this case was heard before the same district judge as in
Starker I, the court implicitly held that its prior decision in favor
5. 751 U.S.T.e. 87,142 (D. Or. 1975)(per Solomon, J.).
6. 432 F. Supp. 864 (D. Or. 1977)(per Solomon, J.).
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of the taxpayer in Starker I did not collaterally estop the government from relitigating the applicability of section 1031. 7 The
court found that taxpayer had exchanged his property for a
promise to convey like-kind property in the future, and therefore, the transfer to Crown did not qualify for nonrecognition
treatment under section 1031. 8 It further found the six percent
"growth factor" added to taxpayer's exchange value credit was
taxable as ordinary income. s
In reaching its decision, the district court reconsidered the
statutory purpose of section 1031 and its application and interpretation of Alderson u. Commissioner.1O As to the purpose of
section 1031, the court concluded that section 1031 was enacted
to defer recognition on an exchange of property" which does not
change the nature of the investment. 12 Stating that section 1031
is to be strictly construed,13 the court found that taxpayer "must
bring himself squarely within the explicit provisions of the exception to qualify for nonrecognition treatment. "14
As to the application of Alderson u. Commissioner,15 the district court stated that it had misread Alderson, and therefore reversed itself on the application of Alderson. 18 The court felt that
its previous interpretation would be contrary to the purpose of
section 1031 and would encourage tax avoidance. In Alderson,
7. Id. at 868. See note 19 supra and accomplinying text.
S.ld.
9. Id. at 869.
10. 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963).
11. See Woodbury v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. ISO (1967).
12. See Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479 (1st Cir. 1940).
13. 432 F. Supp. at 867. It is lin exception to the general rule that the entire gain or
loss realized on disposition of property is recognized. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-l(b)
(1962).
14. 432 F. Supp. at S67, citing Coleman v. Commissioner, ISO F.2d 75S, 760 (Sth Cir.
1950).
15. 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963).
16. In Starker I, the court believed that the reasoning in Alderson required the finding that taxpayers were entitled to nonrecognition treatment under section 1031. In the
instant case, the court realized that Alderson was not directly on point. In the opinion of
Judge Solomon, who wrote the opinion in Starker I:
I have considered my opinion in Starker I. I now conclude that
I was mistaken in my holding as well as in my earlier reading
of Alderson. Even if Alderson can be interpreted as contended
by plaintiff, I think that to do so would be improper. It would
merely sanction a tax avoidance scheme and not carry out the
purposes of § 1031.
432 F Supp. 867-68.
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taxpayer agreed to sell his property. Before the sale was consummated, taxpayer located a second parcel which he wanted to exchange for his property. The escrow agreement was amended,
and ultimately, the parties exchanged deeds. A reciprocal, simultaneous exchange of like-kind property was the result,17 entitling taxpayer to nonrecognition treatment under section 1031.
The district court also attacked T. J. Starker's motives in
Starker II by noting that the "exchange" in question, i.e., the
transfer of all taxpayers' rights in the timberland in return for a
promise to transfer future like-kind property, was an attempt to
unduly expand the definition of "exchange."18 In so doing, taxpayer sought to disguise a sale as an exchange thereby ignoring
the relevant statutory distinctions.
In departing from its application of Alderson followed in
Starker I, the district court implicitly decided that the Government was not collaterally estopped from litigating Starker II.19
Additionally, the court noted that the six percent growth factor
on the exchange balance which was to be paid to Starker at the
time of the last off-setting charge. Believing that the growth factor was really used to conceal the true nature of the transaction,20 the court found that "it was really interest and should be
taxed as ordinary income."21 The district court, in finding for the
17. Unlike Anderson, T. J. Starker did not enter into either a reciprocal nor a simultaneous exchange. Although the court noted that there may be cases where there must be
a simutaneous exchange to qualify for non-recognition treatment under § 1031, this was
not one of them. Id. at 868 n.3.
18. [d. at 868.
19. Id. at 867. While it recognized that many of the transfers of the instant case were
identical to those in Starker I, the court noted issues which were not raised in the former
case. Unlike Starker I, Crown transferred property to a third person, taxpayer's daughter.
Id. The court also made a distinction between the arguments set forth by the Government in Starker I, with those made in Starker 11. For example, in Starker I, the Government claimed that there was no exchange because there was no simultaneous transfer of
property between Crown and the Starkers. In Starker 11, the Government also argued
that there was no like-kind exchange, on the ground that taxpayer transferred his property for a promise which was the equivalent of cash. Id.
20. Id. at 869.
21. [d. Taxpayer claimed that even if the "growth factor" was found to be interest,
it was taxable in 1969 because that was the year Crown reported it as interest and, because the 6% was added to taxpayer's exchange balance at the last offsetting charge in
1969. The court concluded, however, that the parties themselves treated these payments
as having been received in 1967. Crown calculated the "growth factor" daily and kept a
running total in its books under the heading of "interest." Upon acquiring property for
taxpayer, Crown first subtracted the price of the parcel from the accrued interest. Thus,
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Government, dismissed T. J. Starker's action. 22
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the Government is
collaterally estopped from relitigating the applicability of section
1031 to nine of the twelve properties in Starker II.23 With respect
to the remaining Bi-Mart, Timian and Booth properties, collat. eral estoppel did not apply. For these properties the court examined whether T. J. Starker qualified for nonrecognition treatment under section 1031. 24 The court found that taxpayer never
received an interest in the Timian and Bi-Mart properties,25 bethe principle balance was reduced only to the extent that the interest did not cover the
cost of the parcel. Such an arrangement allowed taxpayer to obtain additional interest.
22.Id.
23. 602 F .2d at 1350. The Ninth Circuit outlined its analysis for a collateral estoppel
claim. In order for collateral estoppel to apply, the court must find that the two cases,
Starker I & II, present similar legal question, facts and parties.
1. Legal Question Presented. For collateral estoppel to apply, the issue in the sec·
ond litigation must have been litigated and decided in the first case. Id. at 1344. The first
problem the court faced was that of defining the legal issue for purposes of applying
collateral estoppel. Stated broadly, the legal issue decided in Starker I was whether non·
recognition treatment under section 1031 applied to the transfers pursuant to the
Starker· Crown contract. Except for a change in verbal formula, the argument advanced
by the Government was substantially the same as that in Starker I. The Government
made the same appeals to the legislative history and purpose of section 1031, and there·
fore, the Ninth Circuit was unconvinced that the legal issues presented by the Government were different.
2. Facts. With the exception of Bi-Mart, Timian and Booth, in nine of the twelve
parcels of property received by T. J. Starker, the Ninth Circuit found no consequentional
differences in facts from Starker I, citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979),
and Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948). 602 F.2d at 1345-48. The recent Supreme Court holding in Montana controlled the Ninth Circuit's finding which applies
collateral estoppel in a second case even though some facts differ provided that the differing facts were not "essential to the judgment" or "of controlling significance" in the first
case. 440 U.S. at 158. Although no longer followed on the issue of similarity of facts, the
Ninth Circuit discussed Sunnen at length and noted that it may have led the court to
reach the same results as it did under Montana. 602 F.2d at 1345-47.
3. Parties. Even though T. J. Starker was not a party in Starker I, nor was that suit
in any way financed or controlled by him, (see, Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147
(1979)), and therefore could not have been bound by an unfavorable judgment in Starker
I, T. J. Starker sought to assert an advantageous holding of that case in order to estop
the government's defense. The Ninth Circuit relied on Park lane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322 (1979), where the Supreme Court presented a new analysis for cases involving
the offensive use of collateral estoppel. Although the Ninth Circuit remarked that the
district court "did not have the benefit of Parklane Hosiery u. Shore when it decided
[Starker 11)" the court nevertheless applied the principles set forth in Parkland Hosiery
and held that the government is estopped from pursuing its claims against T. J. Starker
because of the final resolution in Starker I. 602 F.2d at 1349.
24. Id. at 1350.
25. The Timian property is a residence. The Bi-Mart property is a commercial
bUilding. T. J. Starker claims to have expended substantial time and money in maintenance'and improvements in the three months before it was transferred to his daughter.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980

5

498

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 15

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:493

cause he was never given title to them. Title to both parcels was
transferred from Crown directly to taxpayer's daughter. 26 Consequently, Timian 27 and Bi-Mart could not be considered properties received by taxpayer in exchange for his timberland. 28
As to the remaining Booth property, despite the contingencies attached to the property,28 including the possibility that T.
J. Starker might receive cash,30 the court found that taxpayer
received the equivalent of a fee interest for purposes of section
1031. 31 Both issues of whether taxpayer had, in fact, received
like-kind property and whether the exchange had to be simultaneous were also resolved in T. J. Starker's favor. 32 The court
further held that the six percent growth factor taxpayer received
was in fact disguised interest on Crown's unpaid credit balance. 33
He also emphasizes that he controlled and ordered the property to be conveyed to her.
26. In 1968, taxpayer paid a gift tax on these two properties, but whether he actually
owed this tax was not a issue. [d. at 1350 n.7.
27. Specifically as to the Timian property, the Ninth Circuit held that nonrecognition could not be given to residential property. [d. at 1350. The court declared that "it
has long been the rule that use of property solely as a personal residence is antithetical to
its being held for investment," since losses on the sale or exchange of such property are
not deductible. [d., citing Treas. Reg. § 1.165-9{a) (1954).
28. Under an analogous nonrecognition provision, § 1034 provides that maintaining
continuity of title is paramount to receiving nonrecognition treatment. If title shifts from
one taxpayer to another, with the exception of one's spouse, nonrecognition is denied.
Marcello v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1967). In some cases an identity of
economic interests may be viewed between father and daughter. McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694 (1974). However, the Ninth Circuit held that unity is insufficient
to consider transfer of title to one the same as transfer of title to the other. 602 F.2d 1351.
29. Legal title for the Booth property had not passed by deed to the taxpayer.
Rather, Starker held a third-party purchasers' right under a sales agreement which provided for a life interest to the original transferor. Until the life interest ends, legal title
cannot pass. However, until then, purchasers are entitled to possession subject to restrictions. If any of the conditions are violated, the seller may elect, inter alia, to void the
·contract. [d.
30. See text accompanying notes 38 to 40 supra.
31. For purposes of determining whether the properties exchanged are of like-kind, a
leasehold interest of 30 years or more is the equivalent of a fee interest. Century Elec. Co.
v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155, 160 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1952). Treas.
Reg. § 1.1031 (a)-l{c) (1954). See Rev. Rul. 72-601, 1972-2 C.B. 467 (A father and his son
were both farm owners. The father owned in fee simple a 1oo-acre farm. The son owned
in fee simple a 142-acre farm. Father and son conveyed their properties to each other.
Son reserved a remainder interest in the property he transferred to his father. Likewise,
the father reserved a life estate in the property he conveyed the remainder interest to his
son. Neither conveyences by the father nor the son were found to qualify for nonrecognition under § 1031 of the Code).
32. See notes 39 to 49 supra and accompanying text.
33. Despite Starker's contention that the 6% merely compensated him for timber
growth, the court pointed out that T.J. Starker was entitled to the payments regardless
of the actual fate of the timber. 602 F.2d at 1356.
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Finally, the court held that income arising out of taxpayer's
rights in his contract with Crown was treated as being received
at the time contract was made. 3•
While the Ninth Circuit decided numerous issues in Starker
u. United States, this Note will focus on the most critical issues
presented by the court: whether section 1031 requires simultaneity of deed transfers, and whether the exchanges were of qualified like-kind property. These issues arose primarily in the
court's discussion involving the transfer of the Booth property
and, therefore, will be discussed solely in that context ..
C.

THE COURT'S REASONING BEHIND THE BOOTH PROPERTY

Two features of the Booth transaction were pinpointed by
the court to trigger the recognition of gain. First, there was the
likelihood that taxpayer would receive cash instead of real property. Second, a time gap existed in the transfers of exchange
property.
The court began its analysis by adopting a broad and liberal
interpretation of section 1031. It rejected the Government's argument that nonrecognition under section 1031 is to be narrowly
construed under Treasury Regulation 1.1002-1(b).35 The court
pointed out that this interpretation of the regulation is to be
34. Since the Timian and Bi·Mart properties were deemed "boot," i.e., not like·kind
property under § 1031, Starker recognized gain to the extent of the fair market values of
these properties on the dates which their title passed to taxpayer's daughter. However, as
to the disguised interest, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, and held that T. J.
Starker is liable for ordinary income in 1967. Id ..
This holding, which looks to the year taxpayer made the transaction rather than the
year he actually received the income, has created a possible loophole. The Internal Reve·
nue Service is usually blocked by the statute of limitations from collecting tax if the time
lapse is over three years, as was the case in Starker. I.R.C. § 6501.(1954). The court
acknowledged that some administrative difficulties might arise, l;lUt referred responsibility to Congress.
35. [d. at 1352, 1353. Nonrecognition under § 1301 is a noted exception to the general rule requiring recognition of all gains and losses. Treas. Reg. 1·1002·1 (c) (1954).
Under subsection (b), the Government argued:
The exceptions from the general rule. . . are strictly construed
and do not extend either beyond the words or the underlying
assumptions and purposes of the exception. Nonrecognition is
accorded by the Code only if the exchange if one which satis·
fies both (1) the specific description in the Code of an excepted
exchange, and (2) the underlying purpose for which such ex·
change is excepted from the general rule.
602 F.2d at 1352.
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seriously questioned in light of the lack of a clear underlying
purpose36 to section 1031 and a long line of cases liberally construing this sectionY
Having adopted its liberal stance, the court first addressed
the issue of whether the possibility that Starker might receive
cash rendered section 1031 inapplicable. The court examined a
series of cases involving the possibility of a cash transaction38
and found that the mere possibility at the time of the agreement
that a cash sale might occur does not prevent the application of
section 1031. 39 The Government argued that the cases were distinguishable in that the possibility of a receipt of cash may have
existed at the time of the exchange agreement, but did not exist
at the time the taxpayer transferred the property. 40 This difference in timing, the Government argued, distinguished Starker II
from the cases cited by the court.
Next, the Ninth Circuit, relying on the broad interpretation
of section 1031 in the earlier cited cases, gave only cursory treatment to the requirement of a simultaneous transfer. Redwing
Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson 41 was cited as being "at least one ap36. The court pointed out the problem with applying a strict construction of § 1031
when the underlying purpose of the section is unclear and "elusive." Two major considerations loomed behind the drafters enactment of § 1031, but the Starker II court found
that neither of them can be viewed as controlling.
According to the liquidity rationale, "the provision was designed to avoid the imposition of tax on persons who do not cash in on their investments in trade or business property." [d. at 1352. The valuation rationale grew from the supposed consideration of the
drafters of the difficulty of valuing property exchanged for the sole purpose of determining gain or loss. Id.
37. Id. at 1353 & n.10.
38. See, e.g., Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967)(Even though
taxpayer received cash, the court indicated its agreement with the cash option approach
when taxpayer retains right to receive like-kind property.); Coastal Terminals, Inc. v.
United States, 320 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1963)(In this "three-comer exchange," taxpayer
and the other party maintained the option to bring about a cash sale until closing.);
Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963)(Taxpayer entered into a cash sale
agreement, but later changed to a like-kind exchange with sale option); Mercantile Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 82 (1935). (Taxpayer qualified for nonrecognition treatment because of intention to get other property, if possible, rather than cash.). Cf. Smith
v. Commissioner, 537 F.2d 972 (8th Cir. 1976)(transfer of cash to and from taxpayer's
hands defeated the application of § 1031).
39. 602 F.2d at 1354.
40. [d.

41. 399 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1968). In Redwing Carriers, taxpayer attempted to deduct
a loss in the purchase of new trucks to replace his used trucks. To prevent nonrecognition
exchange under § 1031, the parent corporation transferred the old trucks to a subsidiary
who sold them to the manufacturer for cash, and the corporation then bought new trucks
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pellate decision" which indicates that exchanges may not have
to be simultaneous for section 1031 treatment,42 In that case, the
Fifth Circuit court permitted some lack of simultaneit.y. Despite
the Government's contentions, the court, without elaboration,
declined to draw a line distinguishing the time gap in the title
exchanges of the previous cases from the more "substantial" period of time in Starker. 43
Finally, the court addressed both of the Government's contentions that taxpayer's contract right to receive land was not
"like" title to property. The Government insisted that the contract right to land was like cash, and asked the court to impose a
"cash equivalency" test 44 to determine the applicability of section 1031. Declining to apply such a test, the Ninth Circuit
stated, "that title to land is no more or less equivalent to cash
than a contract right to buy land."45 The force of the court's
position rested in a re-emphasis on the purpose of section 1031:
to avoid the inequity of taxpayer being forced to recognize a
"gain which was still tied up in a continuing investment of the
same sort. "48
The Government also raised the argument that a contract
right to land is a "chose in action."47 Being personal property
rather than real property, a "chose in action" would, therefore,
not qualify as a like-kind exchange under section 1031. 48 The
Ninth Circuit responded, stating:
[TJitle to real property, like a contract right to
purchase real property, is nothing more than a
bundle of potential causes of action: for trespass,
for cash. The court disallowed the loss deduction holding that a tax-free exchange could
not be transformed into two sales by the arbitrary separation of time and cash. Id. at 659.
42. 602 F.2d at 1355.
43.Id.
44. Id. see generally Scholossberg, Cash Equivalent and Constructive Receipt-How
These Doctrines Bring Immediate Taxation, 22 J. TAX. 18 (1965).
45.Id.
46. Id., quoting Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453, 456 (2nd Cir.
1959).
.
47. For a general definition, see 63 AM. JUR. 2d Property 26,27 (1972). Compare Oregon Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 192 (1953) with Starker v. United States, 602
F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979) In Oregon Lumber, land was exchanged for standing timber.
The court held that an exchange of realty for personalty is not an exchange of like-kind
property. Since this was a right to cut and remove property, similar to utilization of
property, it can be distingu·ished from Starker. Starker actually received the right to the
land itself, not personal property on the land.
48. For the relevant statutory language of § 1031, see note 2 supra.
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to quiet title, for interference with quiet enjoyment and so on. The bundle of rights associated
with ownership is obviously not included from
section 1031; a contract right to assume the rights
of ownership should not be believe, be treated
as any different than the ownership rights themselves.~g

The court returned to a consideration of the statutory purpose of section 1031 and concluded that if taxpayer ultimately
received property rather than cash, the exchange would qualify
as like-kind. 50 This holding is supported by Biggs u. Commissioner,s, where the Tax Court found that as long as taxpayer
solely obtains contractual rights to qualifying property, instead
of contractual rights plus cash, .the transaction status is preserved as an exchange. 52

D.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S REASONING

Simultaneity Not Required

The Ninth Circuit, by holding that exchanges need not be
simultaneous to qualify under section 1031, has created a possible loophole for taxpayers wishing to avoid the taxation of gain
on an eventual cash transaction. The Starker II court flatly refused to draw a line between "some lack"53 of simuluaneity and a
"substantial"54 lack of simultaneity. This finding may well be erroneous in light of the weight of authority permitting only a
slight delay in exchanges, and the potential result, allowing taxpayers to completely avoid taxation. 55
The Government's argument, although not clearly articulated, was that the difference in timing of the exchanges renders
Redwing Carriers, Inc. u. Tomlinson 58 and the Alderson line of
49. 602 F.2d at 1355.

5O.Id.
51. 69 T.C. 905 (1978).
52. Id. at 919. See generally Price, Exchanging Like-Kind Property Under Section
1031, 56 TAXES 594 (1978).
53. 602 F.2d at 1354-55. See Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652, 655
(5th Cir. 1968).
54. 602 F.2d at 1355.
55. Commentators have suggested the need for Congressional intervention. See generally Harrock, Section 1031 Exchanges: Step Transaction Analysis and the Need for
Legislatiue Amendment, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 351 (1976).
56. 399 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1968).
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cases57 inapplicable. This argument has some merit. In Redwing
Carriers, the court relied on the fact that mutual transfers occured "at or about" the same time. 58 True, the transfers were not
simultaneous, but they did occur within a matter of months, not
years. T. H. Baird Publishing Co. u. Commissioner,59 while not
mentioned by the court, holds that a nonsimultaneous exchange
qualifies under section 1031. Yet Baird is distinguishable on two
grounds. First, although taxpayer deeded his property prior to
the exchange, he retained beneficial ownership during the interim months. Thus, taxpayer conveyed beneficial ownership of
property at the same time that he received like-kind property
from the other party. 80 Baird has therefore been argued as representing a simultaneous exchange. 8t Second, like Redwing Carriers, the time delay in Baird was only a matter of months.
By eliminating simultaneity and permitting open-ended
transactions the Starker court has allowed taxpayers the option
to determine whether they want to receive property, or simply
cash. 82 Taxpayer can, thereby, avoid being taxed on substantial
gain by holding open beyond the statute of limitations those
transactions which they do not intend to exchange for like-kind
property. 83

Contract Right Qualifies as Like-Kind
The court's position that Starker's receipt of a contract right
to land was not equivalent to cash, but actually qualified as a
57. Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967); Coastal Terminals, Inc. v.
United States, 320 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1963); Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th
Cir. 1963); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 82 (1935).
58. 399 F.2d at 655.
59. 39 T.C. 608 (1962). Baird involved a three-party exchange where taxpayer
deeded the property while retaining use of the property, rent free, until the other party
acquired property on which to construct a new building. This building was to be transferred to taxpayer who would then relinquish use of its formerly deeded property. In order to obtain funds to purchase land on which to construct new building, the other party
immediately deeded taxpayer's property to a third person. See also Coastal Terminals,
Inc. v. United States, 3~0 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1963); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 82 (1935).
60. In Starker II, perhaps taxpayer could have claimed that the 6% "growth factor"
represented a beneficial ownership which was retained only to be conveyed 'at the same
time that Crown transferred the exchange property. See Sloma, The Five- Year Like-Kind
Exchange, 55 NEB. L. REv. 511, 517 (1976).
61. Brief for Appellant at 15, Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979).
62. See generally Huskins, Section 1031 Like-Kind Property Exchanges; Possibilities
and Pitfalls, 30 So. CALIF. TAX lNST. 459, 489 (1978).
63. See note 34 supra.
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like-kind exchange has been attacked by the Government84 as
well as commentators under a constructive receipt of cash argument.a5 The general constructive receipt rule states that if taxpayers actually or constructively receive cash for their investment, liquidation has occurred and section 1031 does not apply.a8
Under this principle, taxpayers, although not in actual physical
control over cash, may be in such close relationship to its control
that they will be considered in "constructive receipt" for tax
purposes. For example, if income is credited to taxpayer's account, and all taxpayer must do is reach for it, then the income
will be regarded as constructively received. 87 The only requirement, however, is that there must be no substantial limitations
or restrictions on obtaining its use, nor on its expenditure. a8
A constructive receipt argument may apply to the facts in
Starker II, which would therefore mean that section 1031 should
not apply.ou T. J. Starker, although not having direct control
over how the money was to be used, had rights 70 under the agreement providing sufficiently broad authority over the purchase of
property as to be equivalent to control over cash.7I
64. Brief for Appellee at 27, Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979).
65. See generally Sloma, supra note 60, at 514. In this Note the writer discussed the
implication of Starker I. The perspective indicates that the definition of "exchange" was
extended far beyond the contemporaneous swapping of property for which the section
had previously been used.
66. Harrock, supra note 55, at 355.
67. See J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX § 82 (1973). For further discussion, see
Horsley, Tax Liability Without Cash: How "Constructive Receipt" Traps Taxpayers, 31

J. TAX. 116 (1969).
68. J. CHOMMIE, supra note 67, at 224. For cases which stand for the proposition that
where limitations upon the receipt of income are an integral part of the agreement be·
tween parties and that taxpayer does not have an unqualified right to receive cash, the
funds are deemed not constructively received, see McCouley V. United States, 193 F.
Supp. 938 (E.D. Ark. 1961); Woodbury V. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 180 (1967); Amend v.
Commissioner, 13 T.C. 178 (1949).
69. The Government argued that the facts in Starker closely paralleled those in
Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967). In Carlton, however, the taxpayer
in exchange for the desired property was assigned not only purchase contracts, but was
also given cash for the total amount of their purchase price.
Similarly, in Rogers V. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 126 (1965), taxpayer used the cash
received on an option on his land to purchase the like-kind property. The court held that
the receipt of cash caused the transaction to become a sale, rather than an exchange. ld.
at 137.
70. Taxpayer was able to specify: what type of property he desired; when he chose to
receive it; and how much of the credit balance was to be expended to obtain the
property.
71. (19751 61-3rd TAX MNGM'T (BNA)§ A-14.
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Ultimately, the constructive receipt argument is too weak
to prevail in Starker II. Taxpayer neither received cash nor had
the right under the contract to demand cash instead of property;
that right was reserved for Crown. Starker had no more control
over the cash used by Crown to purchase exchange property than
any other taxpayer in multi-party transfer.

E.

THE RESULT:

A MODIFIED

SUBSTANCE OVER FORM

Although the Ninth Circuit disavowed any reliance on the
"substance over form" truism 72 in Starker II through its holdings the court has strongly reinforced the use of this argument
when deciding section 1031 cases. Having long been limited to
formally structuring transfers to fit within section 1031, taxpayers have gained added flexibility by this court-approved emphasis on the substance of the transaction. When using the substance over form argument for the application of section 1031,
a taxpayer must merely show that the ultimate transaction constitutes an exchange of like-kind property rather than a sale.
The Ninth Circuit's holding is consistent with cases allowing
unlimited flexibility in achieving nonrecognition under section
1031. Transactions have differed as to number of parties, to
types of property exchanged, and to options and time of the
transfers. 73 Furthermore, Congressional intent74 not to tax a con72. When the "substance over form" argument is advanced, taxpayers usually structure their transactions in a way that superficially will qualify under a Code section. The
" Government will ignore taxpayer's strict adherence to the form requirement and focus on
the substance and result of the transaction. Typically, the Government has used Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945), and Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
465 (1935) to support its argument. Both cases involved corporate taxpayers who tried to
structure transactions which would best take advantage of the Code; both corporations
lost their cases. The courts emphasized the substance versus form dichotomy: "[Plutting
aside, then, the question of motive in respect to taxation altogether, and fixing the character of the proceeding by what actually occurred, what do we find?" [d. at 469. In Court
Holding Co., the Court responded:
The incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a
transaction. The tax consequences which arise from gains from
a sale of property are not finally to be determined solely by the
means employed to transfer legal title. Rather, the transaction
must be viewed as a whole, and each step from commencement of negotiations to the consummation of the sale, is
relevant.
.
324 U.S. at 334.
Now courts have used these cases to support taxpayers who structure like-kind property exchanges under a tax avoidance motive. See generally Sloma, supra note 60; Huskins, supra note 63, at 491-94.
73. See, e.g., Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1968);
Coastal Terminals, Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1963); Alderson v. Com-
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tinued investment in like-kind property also enhances a "substance over form" approach. It does, therefore, appear consistent
for the Ninth Circuit to relax the rigid timing formality to not
require a simultaneous exchange; and to expand the types of
qualifying property exchanges to include a contract right to land
to be like-kind to title to real property.
At least one major form element is still required for section
1031 treatment. Taxpayers are cautioned to avoid the receipt of
or control over cash. 75 This constraint is clearly illustrated by the
harsh result in Carlton v. United States,76 where the Fifth Circuit taxed the transaction as a sale because cash passed through
taxpayer hands. While courts are increasingly more tolerant for
added flexibility in section 1031 transactions, a major form requirement remains. The effect has been the courts' adoption of
missioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963); Biggs v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 905 (1978); Baird
Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 608 (1962); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 32
B.T.A. 82 (1935).
74. The Report accompanying the 1934 Revenue Act provided some insight into the
legislative intent of § 1031:
.
[Plrofit or loss is recognized in the case of exchanges of notes
or securities, which are essentially like money; or in the case of
stock in trade; or in the case the taxpayer exchanges the property comprising his original investment for a different kind of
property; but if the taxpayer's money is still tied up in the
same kind of property as that in which it was originally invested, he is not allowed to compute and deduct his theoretical
loss on the exchange, nor is he charged with a tax upon his
theoretical profit. The calculation of the profit or loss is deferred until it is realized in cash, marketable securities, or
other property not of the same kind having a fair market
value. The Treasury Department states that its experience indicates that this provision does not in fact result in tax avoidance. If all exchanges were made taxable, it would be necessary to evaluate the property received in exchange in
thousands of horse trades and similar barter transactions each
year, and for the time being, at least, claims for theoretical
losses would probably exceed any profits which could be established. The committee does not believe that the net revenue
which could thereby be collected, particularly in these years,
would justify the additional administrative expense. Consequently, the exchange provisions have not been changed.
H. R. REp. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2nd Sess. 1939-1 (1934).
Some commentators argue that such allowance of formality to prevail over substance
of a transaction has resulted in frustration of the legislative purpose behind § 1031. See
generally Harrock, supra note 55.
75. The House debates on the Revenue Act of 1924 indicate that gain must be recognized if property is reduced to cash at any time during the transaction. 65 CONGo REc.
2799 (1924).
76. 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967).
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nonrecognition under section 1031 in cases, such as Starker II
and Redwing Carriers involving sale-reinvestment transactionsY

E.

CONCLUSION

It is difficult to ascertain the Ninth Circuit's intended scope

on the nonsimultaneity issue. By failing to limit nonsimultaneous exchanges to months as in Redwing Carriers, as opposed to
years as in Starker II, the court has paved the way for taxpayers
to avoid taxation on a cash transaction. Finally, despite the
court's unwillingness to apply a "substance over form" approach, this concept inherently exists in the court's holdings. As
a result, taxpayers have added flexibility to the extent of timing
and the kind of qualifying like-kind property.

Carol M. Kingsley

II. THE DAVIS DECISION: EXPANSION OF NONRECOGNITION OF INVOLUNTARY CONVERSIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
During the past term, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
was faced in Davis v. United States' with two important issues
concerning nonrecognition of involuntary conversion. First, can a
taxpayer who has invested condemnation proceeds in improvements to previously purchased property qualify for nonrecognition of gain under section 1033 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954?2 Second, is subsection (a)3 or subsection (g)4 the proper
77. Policy reasons may be raised as to the undersirability of such a result. Arguably.
the holdings in Redwing Carriers and now Starker II, have extended § 1031 too far and
perhaps are encouraging abuse under the Code. But see Harrock, supra note 55 for a
discussion of the desirability of such an extension.
1. 589 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. Jan., 1979)(per Wallace, J.; the other panel members were
Chambers and Anderson, JJ.).
2. I.R.C. § 1033 (1954). The predecessor was 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1939) § 112(O(3)(A).
3. I.R.C. § 1033(a)(3)(A) (1954) provides in part:
(a) General rule. If property (as a result of its destruction in
whole or in part, theft, seizure, or requisition or condemnation
or threat or imminence thereoO is compulsorily or involuntarily
converted- . . . .
(3) Conversion into money where disposition occurred after
1950.-Into money or into property not similar or related in
service or use to the converted property . . . the gain (if any)
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vehicle for this expansion of section 1033?
Affirming the district court's finding, the Ninth Circuit decided that a taxpayer can qualify for nonrecognition of gain by
maintaining a substantial continuation of its prior commitment
of capital through appropriate improvements. Hence, investment
by purchase of new real property is not necessary under section
1033. Although the district court and the Ninth Circuit held for
the taxpayer, their reasonings were different. Instea.d of examining the soundness of the lower court's application of the "like
kind" test of subsection (g), the court of appeal went directly to
subsection (a) and used the "similar or related in service or in
use" standard. By doing so, the Ninth Circuit undoubtedly reinforced, as a matter of law, the broad applicability of this code
section, but unfortunately for the tax practitioner, failed to provide much direction in the appropriate selection and use between
subsections (a) and (g) and their respective tests.
B.

BACKGROUND

In Davis, taxpayers reinvested proceeds from the condemnashall be recognized except to the extent hereinafter provided in
this paragraph:
(A) Nonrecognition of gain.-If the taxpayer during the pe·
riod specified in subparagraph (B), for the purpose ofreplacing
the property so converted, purchases other property similar or
related in service or use to the property so converted, or pur·
chases stock in the acquisition of control of a corporation own·
ing such other property, at the election ofthe taxpayer the gain
shall be recognized only to the extent that the amount realized
upon such conversion (regardless of whether such amount is
received in one or more taxable years) exceeds the cost of such
other property or such stock.
With minor modifications not relevant here, this section has been redesignated as section
1033(a)(2)(A) by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94.455, § 1901(a)(128)(A),(B),
90 Stat. 1785 (1976).
4. I.R.C. § 1033(g)(l) (1954) provides:
(g) Condemnation of real property held for productive use in
trade or business or for investment.- (1) Special rule.-For
purposes of subsection (a), if real property (not including stock
in trade or other property held primarily for sale) held for pro·
ductive use in trade or business or for investment is (as the
result of its seizure, requisition, or condemnation, or threat or
imminence thereof) compulsorily or involuntarily converted,
property of a like kind to be held either for productive use in
trade or business or for investment shall be treated as property
similar or related in service or use to the property so converted.
This section has been redesignated as § 1033(0(1) by the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Pub.
L. No. 94·455, § 1901(a)(128)(C), 90 Stat. 1920 (1976).
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tion of their agricultural and fishery property in improvements on
their previously purchased industrial park.5 The improvements
consisted of the installation of a storm drainage and water system, the grading of land, and excavation of a roadway. 6 Reinvestment was made within the requisite period prescribed in section
1033(a)(3)(B).7 The Internal Revenue Service did not consider
these expenditures to be qualified replacement property and assessed a deficiency against taxpayers.s Taxpayers paid the addi5. As trustees of the estate of James Campbell, the taxpayers owned and leased real
property at various locations in the state of Hawaii. The land included industrial and
agricultural property, with a sea fishery adjacent to the agricultural property. In the will
of James Campbell, trustees were admonished to keep the land intact and not to sell it
unless it was in the best interest of the trust. As a result, the trustees had established and
consistently followed a policy of leasing trust lands while continually improving the land
for purposes of increasing the production of income. Since 1901, the Campbell trustees
had sold less than 4% of the land in private sales. See Brief for Appellees, Davis v. United
States, 589 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1979).
In the late 1960's and early 1970's portions of taxpayers' agricultural land were condemned by the state for the construction of highways. As a result of the condemnations,
plaintiffs realized a net amount exceeding $260,000 during the years 1966, 1968, and 1971.
Taxpayers realized an additional $7,700 in 1970 from the condemnation of a fishing area
and land zoned for agriculture. Again, in 1971, an additional $25,000 was realized from
the condemnation of the fishery.
Taxpayers' leased lands, which had been condemned for highway purposes, had been
used primarily for livestock grazing and the cultivation of sugar cane. Most of the condemnation proceeds from these lands were used in the regular course of the estate's business
operations. However, in 1972, taxpayers expended approximately $335,800 in permanent
improvements in land they owned at Campbell Industrial Park. Davis v. United States,
411 F. Supp. at 964-65 (1976).
6. Taxpayers reinvested $296,154.06. This included: $171,000 for land grading;
$36,849.60 for a storm drainage system; $79,380 for a water system; and $48,600 for roadway excavation. Although the total cost of the improvements was $335,829.60, the amount
of condemnation funds used for improvements was $296,154.06. The difference,
$40,675.54, was paid out of the taxpayers' general business funds. See Brief for Appellees,
supra note 5.
7. Pursuant to the provisions of § 1033(a)(3)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of1954,
the time for purchasing qualified replacement property so as to allow taxpayers to qualify
for nonrecognition with respect to their gain on the condemnations, had been extended to
December 31,1973. See Brief for Appellant, Davis v. United States, 589 F.2d 446 (9th Cir.
1979).
The time period specified by § 1033 usually begins with the date of the disposition of
the converted property, or the earliest date of threat of condemnation, whichever is the
earlier, and ending(i) 2 years after the close of the first taxable year in which any part of the gain is
realized, or
(ii) subject to such terms, conditions and later dates as may be specified by the
Secretary on taxpayer's application.
8. The Internal Revenue Service reasoned that because the investments were improvements on land already owned by taxpayers, it did not qualify as replacement property under § 1033.
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tional tax plus interest' and filed timely claims for refunds. Following the administrative denial of the refund claims, suit was
subsequently filed in the district court.
C.

NONRECOGNITION OF GAIN UNDER SECTION l033(G): THE "LIKE
KIND" TEST

Legislative History

In determining whether gain is to be recogni~ed from the
investment of condemnation proceeds into improvements to real
property, two tests have been used by the courts.IO Both tests are
provided in section 1033 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.
Under section 1033(a)(2)(A)1I gain is not recognized on involuntarily converted property if the replacement property is similar
or related in use to the converted property.12 The scope of this
nonrecognition provision was extended under section 1033(g) 13
which allows the broader "like kind" test to be applied in situations involving condemned real property. Previous to the new
law, involuntary conversions of property resulting from condemnation which was held either for productive use in trade or business or for investment was subject to the same strict constraints
of subsection (a).14 Consequently, inequities resulted whereby
9. The amount attributed to the condemnation proceeds was $106,050. 589 F.2d at
447.
10. Although courts have typically applied two tests for the nonrecognition of invol·
untary conversions, the Internal Revenue Service applies an additional third test. Apart
from the "like kind" test, the Service has divided the "similar in service or use" test into
two discrete tests. The basis of the division as set forth in Revenue Ruling 64·237, 1964·2
C.B. 319, is the distinction between two classes of owners: owner·users and owner·lessors.
A "functional" test applies to owner·users of property. Id. at 319·320. For owner· lessors,
the test focuses more on the relationship of the lessor to both the converted property and
the replacement property. Id. at 320. For a discussion of the uncertainty of standards
resulting in poor tax planning see Comment, Involuntary Conversions and the Question
of Qualified Replacement Property, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 331 (1977).
11. For the text of § 1033(a)(2)(A), see note 3 supra.
12. See note 25 and 26 infra, and accompanying text.
13. For the text of § 1033(g), see note 4 supra. Section 1033(g) was added to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 by amendment in 1958. Section 46(a), Technical Amend·
ment Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 1641.
14. Section 1033 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code provides for the nonrecognition
of gain or loss where the proceeds of property involuntarily converted are reinvested in
"property similar or related in service or use to the property so converted." The courts
construe that phrase very strictly to require that the property be very similar in economic
usage to the property destroyed, condemned or otherwise involuntarily converted. J. RAB·
KIN AND M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFI' AND ESTATE TAXATION § 43.08 (1954). The
construction given to the similar property requirement of section 1033 was much stricter
than the construction given to the phrase "property of a like kind" in the case of exchanges
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persons who voluntarily traded property were afforded much
more freedom than persons who involuntarily parted with property.15 Many landowners whose property was condemned by reason of changing social and economic factors were faced with the
choice of either reinvesting their proceeds in land which qualified
under the requirements of subsection (a), but which was in an
entirely different geographic area, or of paying the gains tax. The
spirit of section 1033 was to protect taxpayers from taxation of all
involuntarily realized income if they took steps to replace the
converted property in such a way as to represent a continuity in
investment. Subsection (g) was added to specifically protect the
interests of landowners subjected to real property condemnation.
The District Court Decision

Since taxpayers' improvements were not of the "same general class"" as the condemned agricultural land, the improvements did not qualify for nonrecognition of gain as "property
similar or related in service or use" within the meaning of section
1033(a)(3)(A). Rather the district court concluded that the improvements were "like kind" and that taxpayers could elect to
defer recognition of gain under subsection (g). The court looked
to section 1.1031(a)-1(b) of the Treasury Regulations 17 which has
of property held for investment or for productive use in a trade or business. [d. § 43.10(2).
See Thompson, Liberalization of Rules Prouiding for Tax Free Treatment of Reinuestment
of Proceeds of Condemnation Award, 1959 So. CALIF. TAX !NST. 52.
15. For example, the owner of a farm might exchange his farm for income producing
real property without recognition of gain. H, on the other hand, the farm was condemned,
the proceeds could not be invested in income real estate without the realization of gain.
[d.

16. This was a phrase first used in Steuart Brothers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d
580 (4th Cir. 1958). Steuart Brothers, was also the first of a series of cases that established
the rule that considered the investment character of property to be important in the
qualification of replacement property under § 1033(a)(2)(A). In Steuart Brothers, taxpayer was engaged in a real estate business and owned a tract of land that he planned to
rent as a warehouse or grocery store. After the property was condemned, taxpayer bought
two new properties, both of which were rental properties. In reversing the Tax Court, the
Fourt Circuit,compared the real estate held by the taxpayer before and after the conversion. The court concluded that real estate held for investment is similar or related in
service or use if the reinvestment is in real estate of the "same general class." However,
the court gave no elucidation on what it meant by that phrase. This approach was approved in S.E. Ponticos, Inc. v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1964).
The district court in Dauis relied on Filippini v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 286 (N.D.
Cal. 1961). In Filippini, a farm and drive-in theater were replaced by urban lots on which
taxpayer erected an office building. The lower court held that the replacement property
was not of the "same general class" as the condemned property and therefore was not
"similar or related in service or use" within the meaning of subsection (a). [d. at 294.
17. The term "like kind" was first used in section 1031 ofthe Internal Revenue Code
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defined "like kind" as referring to "the nature or character of the
property and not to its grade or quality."18 For further clarification, the court cited Commissioner v. Crichton lU which stated
that "the distinction intended and made by the statute is the
broad one between classes and characters of properties, for instance, between real and personal property."20 Therefore, since
both their improvements and their condemned property were real
property, taxpayers qualified for nonrecognition under the definition of "like kind."
Additionally, the lower court looked to the purpose of the
statute and whether or not the improvements made by taxpayers
"re-establishes [their] prior commitment of capital. "21 Code section 1033 is to be liberally construed to accomplish this purpose.
Referring to Filippini v. United States,22 the court pointed out
that under the "like kind" test, "it appears that the replacement
of one investment property for another investment property,
without regard to any dissimilarity of characteristics or uses,
would be allowable."23 Thus, in keeping with the spirit of the
Code, the lower court found that taxpayers made a substantial
continuation of their prior commitment of capital and specifiof 1954 which provides nonrecognition for voluntary exchanges of "like kind" property.
For the application of this section, the test is set forth in Treas. Reg. § 1.1031{a)-(1)(b)
(1979). Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(g)-(1)(a) (1979) has adopted this same test to be used in the
application of I.R.C. § 1033(g).
18. The definition of "like kind" in Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(b) further provides:
one kind of class of property may not, under that section, be
.138
139
exchanged for property of a different kind or class. The fact
that any real estate involved is improved or unimproved is not
140
material, for that fact relates only to the grade or quality of the
141
property and not to its kind or class.
19. 122 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1941). In Crichton, taxpayer exchanged her undivided
interest in rights to oil, gas, and other minerals, all produced from rural lands, for undivided interests in a hotel. Using a broad interpretation of "like kind," the court held the
exchange non-taxable under section 112(b)(1), Rev. Act of 1936, predecessor to I.R.C. §
1031(a). [d. at 182.
20. For the broad construction given the term "like kind" see Alabama By-Products
Corp. v. Patterson, 258 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1958); Fleming v. Campbell, 205 F.2d 549 (5th
Cir. 1953). See also 3 J. MERTENS, THE LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 20.171, at 803
(rev. ed. J. Malone 1972); Rev. Rul. 55-749, 1955-2 C.B. 295; Rev. Rul. 70-511, 1970-2
C.B.l66.
21. Filippini v. United States, 318 F.2d 841, 844 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922
(1963).

22. 200 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
23. Id. at 294. However, because the amended § 1033(g) was made expressly applicable only to the involuntary conversions of real estate occurring after the date of the
taxpayers' conversion, the taxpayers in Fillipini could not benefit from the new amendment.
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cally, that their improvements qualified for nonrecognition under
the requirements of subsection (g).
D.

CONTINUITY OF INVESTMENT UNDER SECTION
"SIMILAR OR RELATED IN USE" STANDARD

l033(a):

THE

Given taxpayers' substantial continuation of their prior commitment of capital, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court
erred in concluding that improvements to the park were not
"similar or related in service or in use" to their prior investment
in agricultural land. Part of the basis of the court's opinion rested
on public policy reasons which were attributed to the district
court. Some attention was also given to additional factors identified as reasons for the lower court's granting a refund to taxpayers. The bulk of the opinion, however, concentrated on the appropriate use of the requirements in Filippini for determining .the
applicability of subsection (a). Whether or not the district court
correctly granted relief under subsection (g) was a question never
reached by the appeals court.24
Agreement with the "Unstated Opinion" of the District Court
In part, the Ninth Circuit attributed the district court's
granting of a refund on several public policy reasons. First, it was
virtually impossible for taxpayers to reinvest in agricultural land
with an adjacent sea fishery. Hawaii had declared a public policy
of absorbing ownership of sea fisheries into the public domain.
Additionally, the state's plantation economy had changed to a
mixed industrial, commercial, resort, and agricultural economy.
What little agricultural land was available, would be unaffordable to prospective agricultural tenants.
The court of appeal also credited the lower court with the
following reasons for their judgment. Virtually the same risk was
attendant to taxpayers' investment in the Industrial Park as
would have been in an investment in agricultural property. The
cost of managing either industrial or agricultural tenants was
substantially the same also. Finally, since taxpayers did not provide substantial management services to either the industrial or
24. As the court noted, even if it disagreed with the reasoning of the district judge,
it could affirm the lower court's disposition "on any ground squarely presented on the
record." 589 F.2d 446, 448 n.3. See Grosz v. Andrus, 556 F.2d 972, 974 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977);
M.O.S. Corp. v. John I. Haas Co., 375 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1967); see also Jaffke v.
Dunham, 352 U.S. 280, 281 (1957) (per curiam).
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agricultural tenants, the services provided were essentially
alike. 25
Interestingly enough, the Ninth Circuit enumerated all of the
above reasons as the basis for taxpayers' refund granted by the
district court. Yet the district court judge did not expressly include any of these factors in his opinion.
The Filippini Influence

In Filippini v. United States, 28 the taxpayer purchased urban
property and erected an office building using money received
from the condemnation of substantially rural property. The district court compared the characteristics and uses of the two properties and, after finding that the properties were dissimilar and
not even of the "same general class," refused to allow nonrecognition of the taxpayer's gain. However, when the district court applied the same line of reasoning in Davis, the Ninth Circuit found
the judgment in error. Rather the court interpreted Filippini to
not require that the replacement property be of the "same general
class" as the condemned property before it can qualify under
subsection (a). 27
Instead, the court adopted a long-established test to determine the applicability of subsection (a).
The test is a practical one. The trier of fact must
determine from all the circumstances whether the
taxpayer has achieved a sufficient continuity of
investment to justify nonrecognition of the gain,
or whether the differences in the relationship of
the taxpayer to the two investments are such as
to compel the conclusion that he has taken adantage of the condemnation to alter the nature of his
investment for his own purposes. 28
25. All of these factors listed as reasons for the district court's judgment are factors
which Filippini, 318 F.2d 841, requires in determining the applicability of the "similar or
related in use" test. See notes 29 to 31 infra, and accompanying text.
26. 318 F.2d 841 (9th Cir.),cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963).
27. The court specifically rejected resolution of the issue by "simplistic talismanic
rules." Rather, the court again emphasized the importance of using the test which compares all of the circumstances surrounding the two investments. That taxpayers' condemned agricultural land is not of the "same general class" a8 its improvements to the
park is thus not determinative. Rather, taxpayers' relationship to the two investments
controls. 589 F.2d at 450.
28. 1d. at 449, quoting Filippini v. United States, 318 F.2d 841,844-45 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963).
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To meet the requirements of Filippini the court of appeal
considered a broad range of factors in determining taxpayer's
relationship to both the condemned and replacement property in
order to find a sufficient continuity of investment. 28 Since the
taxpayers held both the condemned and the replacement properties to generate rental income, the inquiry specifically included
"the extent and type of the lessor's management activity, the
amount and kind of services rendered by him to the tenants, and
the nature of his business risks connected with the properties."30
General factors which influence the choice of any investment,
such as the character of the particular properties and the market
of which each is a part, were examined as well. 3t After applying
the test to the facts of the instant case, the Ninth Circuit stated
that taxpayers were entitled to relief under subsection (a).32
E.

SIGNIFICANCE

The most important practical outcome of the Davis decision
is that it substantially broadens the tax opportunities available
to a taxpayer replacing involuntarily converted real property. In
Davis, taxpayers, as recipients of a condemnation award,
expended their proceeds for improvements on land that they already owned. Both the lower court and the Ninth Circuit held the
property eligible for nonrecognition; although it generally has
been held that a purchase of new replacement property is neces-·
29. The Internal Revenue Service originally took the position that the statutory
phrase, "similar or related in service or use" meant that the property acquired had to have
a close "functional" similarity to the property converted. Under this test, the physical
characteristics and the end use of the converted and replacement properties had to be
similar. See Loco Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d 207, 211·14 (8th Cir. 1962). The
Ninth Circuit and several other courts of appeals, however, rejected this approach. Filip·
pini v. United States, 318 F.2d 841, 844·45 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963);
Clifton Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 719, 721·22 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
921 (1963); Pohn v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 427, 429-30 (7th Cir. 1962); Loco Realty Co.
v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d at 215 (8th Cir. 1962); Liant Record, Inc. v. Commission, 303
F.2d 326, 328-29 (2d Cir. 1962); Steuart Bros., Inc. v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 580, 584
(4th Cir. 1958). The Service therefore reconsidered its position in regard to property held
for investment, and now focuses attention on "the similarity in the relationship of the
services or uses which the original and replacement properties have to the taxpayerowner." Rev. Rul. 64-237, 1964-2 C.B. 319, 320. The tax court has also adopted this test.
See Wheeler v. Comm'r ofInternal Revenue, 58 T.C. 459, 463 (1972); Johnson v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 736, 741 (1965). See also 589 F.2d 446, 449 n.8.
30. [d. at 449. See also Filippini v. United States, 318 F.2d at 845, quoting Liant
Record, Inc. v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 326, 329 (2d Cir. 1962).
31. 589 F.2d at 449.
32. [d.
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sary to qualify under 1033. 33
As the Ninth Circuit illustrated in its opinion, the facts of the
Davis case clearly qualified for nonrecognition within the spirit
of the Code. Public Policy and the changing economic base of the
state of Hawaii were correctly considered in deciding the case.
The court's application of both the "similar or related in use" test
and its flexible interpretation of Filippini, 34 not to require replacement property to be of the "same general class," were reasonable.
All of the' circumstances surrounding taxpayers' relationships to
their investments had remained essentially the same. Thus, the
appeals court's decision seemed clearly correct that in keeping
with subsection (a), taxpayers' investment represents a sufficient
continuation of their original investment.
Yet, there are several omissions which limit the usefulness of
the Davis opinion. For years tax practitioners have struggled with
the lack of clear guidelines for determining whether subsection
(a) or (g) is the appropriate section to apply to qualify for nonrecognition of gain. 3G The Ninth Circuit's inattentiveness to these
issues resulted in its loss of an opportunity to clarify some of this
confusion. To the relative exclusion of all other authority, the
court relied on Filippini in deciding Davis. 36 Most emphasized
was the test used for determining the applicability of subsection
(a). From the application of the "similar or related in service or
use" test, the court concluded that taxpayers' reinvestment qual33. Before replacement property can qualify for nonrecognition under either subsections (a) or (g) of section 1033, it must first meet the requirement of having been acquired
by "purchase". In Davis, taxpayers conceded that they did not "purchase" land in replacement of the condemned land. Rather, taxpayers "expended" money for imp~ove
ments on other land which they already owned.
Following the reasoning of the court in Dettmers v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1019 (6th
Cir. 1970), the district court was satisfied that the expenditures made by the taxpayers
in Davis met the "purchase" requirement. In Dettmers, the court traced the legislative
history of § 1033(a)(3). The court concluded that when the requirement that proceeds from
the involuntary conversion be "expended" was replaced by timely "purchase," no substantive change was intended in the nature of the relief afforded under the statute. Additiona\)y, the court believed that the reason the language wos changed from "acquisition"
to "purchase" was that "Congress wanted to specify that the acquisition be by purchase
rather than, for example, by gift or devise." Id. at 1022.
34. See note 27 supra, and accompanying text.
35. See generally Wi11is & Steinmann, Davis Decision May Increase Flexibility in
Replacing Involuntarily Converted Real Property, 56 TAXES 272 (1978); and Comment,
Involuntary Conversions and the Question of Qualified Replacement Property, 38 OHIO
ST. L.J. 331 (1977).
36. See cases cited at notes 37 and 38 infra.
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ified for nonrecognition under subsection (a). In reinforcing its
decision, the court reiterated, again from Filippini, that the purpose of section 1033 "is to relieve the taxpayer of unanticipated
tax liability arising from involuntary conversion of his property
. . . . The statute is to be liberally construed to accomplish this
purpose. "37 Numerous cases and revenue rulings have addressed
and decided controversies relating to the application of section
1033, many of which were used persuasively in counsels' arguments. 3S Yet the court ignored even the most relevant of these. 3t
Despite the court's holding being in complete agreement
with Revenue Ruling 67-255,40 this and all other pertinent rulings
were left unacknowledged. 4• In Revenue Ruling 67-255, the Internal Revenue Service held that, "[l]and is not of the same nature
or character as a building, or a storm drain, or a water system,
or a road."42 Thus, such improvements as these, on property already owned, were not deemed to qualify under the definition of
"like kind." Rather, the facts were to be applied to the "similar
37. 589 F.2d at 450 (1979). See also Pontic08, Inc. v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 477, 479
(6th Cir. 1964); Filippini v. United States, 318 F.2d 841, 844 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 922 (1963); Loco Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d 207, 215 (8th Cir. 1962).
38. See Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, 356 U.S. 260 (1958); Alabama By-Products Corp.
v. Patterson, 258 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1958); Fleming v. Campbell, 205 F.2d 549 (5th Cir.
1953); Commissioner v. Crichton, 122 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1941); Rev. Rul. 73-120, 1973-1
C.B. 369; Rev. Rul. 70-511, 1970-2 C.B. 166; Rev. Rul. 68-394, 1968-2 C.B. 338; and Rev.
Rul. 67-255, 1967-2 C.B. 270.
39. Fleming v. Campbell, 205 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1953); Commissioner v. Crichton,
122 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1941); and Rev. Rul. 67-255, 1967-2 C.B. 270.
40. [d. at 271. Taxpayer constructed a building on land already owned. The IRS held
that neither the building nor storm drains, water systems and roads constructed on land
already owned qualified as replacement property under § 1033(g) a8 being of a like kind
to the land converted involuntarily. However, reference is made to Rev. Rul. 67-254,19672 C.B. 269. Here investment of part of the proceeds of an involuntary conversion, in the
construction of a garage on property already owned, qualified as replacement property
under § 1033(a)(3)(A).
tv
41. See also Rev. Rul. 76-391, 1976-2 C.B. 243 (construction of commercial building
on land already owned by taxpayer held not to qualify as property of like kind to condemned farmland); Rev. Rul. 76-390, 1976-2 C.B. 243 (construction of motel on remaining
portion of property held not to qualify as property of like kind to condemned mobile home
park); Rev. Rul. 73-120, 1973-1 C.B. 369 (held that replacement of a utility company's
water plant and appurtenant pipe lines, mains, etc., with 8 large apartment complex
qualified as a like kind replacement); Rev. Rul. 71-41, 1971-1 C.B. 223 (construction of
gas station on land already owned by taxpayer held not to qualify as property of like kind
to condemned land and warehouse construction); Rev. Rul. 67-254,1967-2 C.B. 269, (held
that construction of improvements may be treated as a purchase of qualifying replacement
property under section 1033(a) for condemned improved land where such improvements
are "related in service or use" to the condemned improvements).
42. [d. at 270.
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or related use" test of subsection (a). This was precisely the
course followed by the Ninth Circuit, but no indication was given
showing that to be its intention.
Finally, the most glaring shortcoming of the opinion was its
lack of attention to subsection (g). Some investments may fall
within the purview of both subsection (a) and subsection (g),
though the focus of inquiry to determine the applicability of each
subsection differ.4s However, in its analysis, the court went directly to section 1033(a) and applied the test in Filippini.44 After
finding that the taxpayers qualified for relief under subsection
(a), the court did not even reach the question of whether the
district court correctly granted relief under subsection (g). In
light of the expressed legislative intent of subsection (g), when
added to the Code and the interpretation of its application by
Revenue Ruling 67-255,41 the district court quite logically reasoned the application of subsection (g) in this case. Considering
the confusion that is enshrouded around the use of the subsection,
the Ninth Circuit should have examined the lower court's application of subsection (g) and have provided a definitive statement
to tax practitioners as to the appropriate selection and use of
subsections (a) or (g) for nonrecognition of involuntary conversions.
CONCLUSION

From Davis it is now clear that construction of improvements
on land owned by a taxpayer is a qualified replacement of converted land under section 1033. At least such is the case when the
involuntary conversion is due to condemnation of property by the
government. The "similar or related in use" test can be successfully applied for determining nonrecognition under subsection
(a); since that was the vehicle used by the Ninth Circuit for this
expansion of section 1033. However, still in question is whether
this same type of replacement could qualify for nonrecognition
under the "like kind" provisions of subsection (g).

Carol M. Kingsley
43.
44.
45.
note 42

589 F.2d at 448.
See note 28 supra _and accompanying text.
See the discussions of- the legislative history of 0 1033(g) at notes 13 to 15, and
supra, and accompanying text.
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III. DEDUCTffiILITY OF START-UP COSTS OF BANK
CREDIT CARD PROGRAMS

A.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In First Security Bank u. Commissioner, I the Ninth Circuit
held that costs initially incurred for participation in a national
bank credit card system constituted ordinary and necessary expenses in carrying on a trade or business. 2
For the 1966 taxable year, the First Security Bank of Idaho
and the First Security Bank of Utah (the taxpayers) deducted
fees paid to Bank-Americard Service Corporation under an
agreement instituting a bank credit card system. The disputed
deductions involved, for each bank, an initial, non-recurring
payment of $12,500. Of this amount, $7,500 was allotted to the
costs of a computer program and servicing. The other $5,000 covered costs for operating manuals, advertising and publicity aids,
marketing "know-how," forms and agreements, training sessions
and other instructions in setting up and running a credit card
operation. 3
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner or
the Government) disallowed each deduction of $12,500, maintdining that the cost should have been capitalized since it was
for a franchise right of indefinite duration. 4 The taxpayers filed a .
petition in Tax Court where the Commissioner argued that the
expenditures were non-deductible pre-operating costs associated
with the banks' entrance into a new line of business, or in the
alternative, the costs were capital expenditures providing future
economic benefits of' an unknown duration. s The Tax Court,
however, ruled against the Government and held that the costs
were fully deductible.'
1. 592 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. Mar., 1979) (per Kilkenny, J.; the other panel members
were Duniway, J. and Belloni, D.J.).
2. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1954) provides: "(a) In General-There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and nece88ary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year
in carrying on any trade or busine88 . . . ."
3. 592 F.2d at 1051. For a more complete description of the agreement entered into
and the items for which expenditures were made, see Rolph and Ruempler, Bank Credit
Cards: The IRS 'New Business' Gambit, 93 BANKING L.J. 269,' 273-77 (1976).
4.Id.
5. 63 T.C. 644, 649 (1975).
6. Id. at 649·51. The Tax Court cited Jack E. Golsen v. Commi88ioner, 54 T.C. 742
(1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 985 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971), in which it announced its policy of making decisions in accordance with the circuit to which the case
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether
the initial cost of participation in a bank credit card system constituted ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in carrying on
a trade or business, deductible under section 162(a)7 of the Internal Revenue Code. In affirming the Tax Court's decision, the
court stated, without elaboration, that it adopted the decision of
the Tenth Circuit in Colorado Springs National Bank v. United
States 8 as the law of the Ninth Circuit. 9 It specifically approved
two other cases, First National Bank v. United States lO and
Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. United States,1I which involved banks joining credit card programs. '2
This Note will examine the Ninth Circuit's decision in First
Security Bank as a part of a growing trend permitting deductibility of expenditures where no identifiable asset has been purchased or created. In addition, this Note will reveal the judiciary's reluctance to deny deductibility of start-up costs in
developing new markets or new products by going concerns. '3
would be appealable. In First Security Bank, the taxpayers' cases were consolidated.
Since one taxpayer was a Utah corporation, an adverse ruling would have been appealed
to the Tenth Circuit which had previously decided the issues in favor of the taxpayer.
See Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974). The
Tax Court specifically noted that it was making no determination "as to our policy
should we be faced with consolidated cases appealable to more than one circuit in which
one of those circuits has spoken on a particular issue and we disagree with said circuit's
position." 63 T.C. at 650 n.19.
7. 592 F.2d at 1051. For the relevant language of § 162(a), see text accompanying
note 14 infra.
8. 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974).
9. 592 F.2d at 1052.
10. 558 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1977).
11. 68 T.C. 872 (1972), aff'd, 592 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1979).
12. The facts and issues presented in First Security Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d
1050 (9th Cir. 1979); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 558 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1977);
Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974); and IowaDes Moines Nat'l Bank v. United States, 68 T.C. 872 (1972), aff'd, 592 F.2d 433 (8th Cir.
1979), were essentially the same and will be hereafter referred to as "the bank credit card
cases."
13. The Internal Revenue Service (the IRS or Service) has pursued these issues aggressively with other types of businesses. Therefore, the reasoning in the bank credit card
cases has application beyond that class of taxpayer. See, e.g., Briarcliff Candy Corp. v.
Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973) (expansion of a distribution system of a candy
company); Madison Gas & Elec. Co., [1979] TAX CT. REp. DEC. (P-R) 72-284 (training
expenses prior to operation of a nuclear power plant operated by the taxpayer and others
as a joint venture); Jack's Cookie Co. v. United States, 597 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1979)
(lease reserve payments made to a local government by a cookie company). At the time
of First Security Bank, there were approximately 4,000 banks being challenged on the
credit card start-up costs issues.
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WERE THE BANKS ENTEmNG A NEW TRADE OR BUSINESS?

In order for an expenditure to be currently deductible under
section 162(a) of the 1954 Code, "an item must (1) be 'paid or
incurred during the taxable year,' (2) be for 'carrying on any
trade or business,' (3) be an 'expense,' (4) be a 'necessary' expense, and (5) be an 'ordinary' expense}· In the bank credit card
cases,15 the Government never contended that the costs were not
paid or incurred during the taxable year or that the costs were
not a "necessary" expense." Rather, the Government argued
that the costs were start-up costs of a new business activity and,
therefore, not deductible. It also argued that the expenditures
were not "ordinary" expenses within the meaning of the Internal
Revenue Code.
New Trade or Business Theory
In support of its first contention that the credit card system
start-up costs were not deductible because the banks were entering a new trade or business, the Commissioner relied on Richmond Television Corp. v. United States. 17 In Richmond Televi14. Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Aas'n, 403 U.S. 345, 352 (1971).
15. See note 12 supra.
16. In Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Aas'n, 403 U.S. 345, 358, the Supreme
Court stated: "Our decisions have consistently construed the term 'necessary' as imposing only the minimal requirement that the expense be 'appropriate and helpful' for 'the
development of the [taxpayer's] busineBB.' "
17. 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965). In Richmond Television no real problem was posed by expenditures which would have had to be
capitalized regardless of when they were incurred. The difficult question involved costs
which would have been currently deductible if incurred after the busineBB became a "going concern." The court stated:
The issue therefore is at what point of time did [the tax·
payer's] business begin . . . . While decisions are to be found
holding that particular taxpayers were or were not engaged in
a trade or business, there is little discussion of the question of
when, in point of time, a trade or business actually begins.
1d. at 905.
The Regulations issued under § 162 do not define what constitutes "carrying on a
trade or business:" In Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500 (1974), the Supreme Court
contrasted the words "carrying on a trade or busineBB" under § 162(a) with § 174(a)(1)
allowing deductions for experimental expenditures paid or incurred "in connection with a
trade or busineBB." The Court held the taxpayer was entitled to such deductions prior to
the point where the product was marketable, stating that § 162 was "not helpful" in
defining "in connection with a trade or busine88" since it was "more narrowly written."
1d. at 503.
Compare the holding in Richmond Television with Treasury regulations i88ued under
I.R.C. §§ 248 and 355. Section 248 provides that a corporation may elect to deduct its
organizational expenditures over a period not le88 than 60 months beginning in the
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sion, the taxpayer had applied to the Federal Communications
Commission (F.C.C.) for a license to operate a television station.
A competitor had also applied for a license in the same area.
Prior to receiving F.C.C. approval, the taxpayer bought out its
competitor by reimbursing it for costs incurred in training television station operators. The taxpayer also incurred further training expenses before it went on the air. It deducted all these costs
in the tax year prior to its receiving its broadcasting license.l S
The Fourth Circuit held that a taxpayer "has not 'engaged in
carrying on any trade or business' within the intendment of section 162(a) until such time as the business has begun to function
as a going concern and performed those activities for which it
was organized,"18 and, therefore the court denied the deduction.
month that the corporation began business. Treas. Reg. § 1.248-1(a)(3) (1956) provides:
The determination of the date the corporation begins business
presents a question of fact which must be determined in each
case in light of all the circumstances of the particular case.
The words "begins business," however, do not have the same
meaning as "in existence." Ordinarily, a corporation begins
business when it starts the business operations for which it was
organized . . . . If the activities of the corporation have advanced to the extent necessary to establish the nature of its
business operations, however, it will be deemed to have begun
business. For example, the acquisition of operating assets
which are necessary to the type of business contemplated may
constitute the beginning of business.
Treas. Reg. § 1.355-l(c) (1955), defines an "active business" for purposes of a distribution of stock of a controlled corporation.
[Flor purposes of section 355, a trade or business consists of a
specific existing group of activities being carried on for the
purpose of earning income or profit from only such group of
activities, and the activities included in such group must include every operation which forms a part of, or a step in, the
process of earning income or profit from such group. Such
group of activities ordinarily must include the collection of income and the payment of expenses.
18. 345 F.2d at 904.
19. The $25,799.19 paid to acquire the competitor's trained staff was deemed "the
acquisition of a capital asset whose value to the taxpayer would continue for many years,
even though from time to time individual staff members could be expected to leave its
employ. Id. at 907. Accord, Radio Station WBIR v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 803 (1959)
(legal and engineering fees, travel and other expenses of prosecuting its applications for
an F.C.C. license); KWTX Broadcasting Co. v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 952 (1959), aff'd
per curiam, 272 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1959) (payment to competitor to dismiss its application for an F.C.C. license held to be in the nature of obtaining an intangible asset);
Frank B. Polachek v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 858 (1954) (costs incurred in planning a new
business investment advisory service); Peters berg Television Corp. v. Commissioner, 20
T.C.M. (P-H)~ 271 (1961) (costs related to seeking television license). The Fourth Circuit
found particularly instructive Cohn v. United States, 57-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9457
(D.C.W.n. Tenn. 1957), aff'd on other grounds, 259 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1958) (training,
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In the bank credit card cases, the Commissioner attempted
to extend this reasoning to new business activities undertaken by
going concerns. 20 Only the Colorado Springs court discussed the
issue thoroughly.21 In Colorado Springs, the Tenth Circuit found
that the credit card system enabled the banks "to carryon an
old business in a l1ew waY,"22 for example, by simplifying the
procedures for granting loans on merchants' accounts receivables
and on extending credit for personal consumer loans. 23 The court
distinguished Richmond Television on the ground that the taxlegal and other expenses incurred prior to the opening of aviator training schools).
The holding in Richmond Television has been criticized. Erbacher, Start-Up Costs:
Are They Deductible by a Corporation for Federal Income Tax Purposes? 48 TAXES 488
(1970); Solomon, Tax Treatment of Pre-Opening Expenses, 46 TAXES 521 (1968). In J.
Rabkin & M. Johnson, Federal Income Gift and Estate Taxation § 3.02 (1963 & Supp.
1980), the authors sta~e: "The Fourth Circuit has adopted the unrealistic rule that 'carrying on' a trade or business requires the performance of the ultimate activities for which
the business was organized."
For other articles dealing with the subject of deductibility of start-up costs, see Buell, Business Start Up Costs: Analyzing and Planning for Current Deductibility, 43 J.
TAX. 278 (1975); Mandell, Deductibility of Pre-Operating Expenses: Successful and Unsuccessful Ventures, 25 N.Y.U. mST. FED. TAX. 1235 (1967); Seago, THE TAX TREATMENT
OF START-UP COSTS, 9 TAX ADVISER 410 (1978).
20. The Commissioner has not been very successful with the extension of the theory.
E.g., Hillcone Steamship Co. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1096 (1963) where a
steamship company was permitted to deduct costs of raising hops, pasturing cattle, leasing stone quarries and cutting timber because these activities constituted a part of the
operations of a farm purchased by the taxpayer and were not an effort to enter separate
businesses. Realtors who concentrate in one area of real estate, such as residential real
estate, may deduct expenses incurred in entering a different area of expertise, such as
commercial real estate. Malmstadt v. Commissioner, 578 F.2d 520 (4th Cir. 1978); York
v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1958). See also Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1184 (1977), where the Tax Court held that a subsidiary,
organized to sell annuity life insurance contracts, had actually begun carrying on business when it made a private sale of such insurance to its parent's pension fund. "[The
taxpayer's] business was not limited to public sales of insurance and annuity contracts,
but simply sales of such contracts." Id. at 1189.
Ct. Madison Gas & Elec. Co., [1979] TAX CT. REp. DEC. (P-H) 72-284 (1979), where
the taxpayer entered into a joint venture to open a nuclear power plant. As part of the
cost of participation in the enterprise, the utility incurred costs of training personnel to
operate the power plant once it came on line. The Tax Court held that the expenses
"were those of the partnership, not the [utility], and that as pre-operational costs of the
partnership's initial activity those expenditures must be capitalized." Id. at 72-310. However, the Commissioner conceded that had the construction of the nuclear plant been
solely for use in business, such pre-operating expenses would have been currently
deductible.
21. With the exception of Colorado Springs, the remaining bank credit card cases
merely adopted the reasoning of Colorado Springs. First Security Bank v. Commissioner,
592 F.2d at 1052, aff'g 63 T.C. at 649; First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 558 F.2d at 72324; Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. United States, 68 T.C. at 877-78.
22. 505 F.2d at 1190.
23.Id.
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payer was not in business during the years the expenses were
incurred. 24 Therefore, the Colorado Springs court concluded: "A
new method [of doing business] is distinguishable from a new
business. "25

Future Benefits us. Asset Creation
Having decided that the banks were already engaged in the
trade or business of credit arrangements, the courts in the credit
card cases turned to the more far-reaching question of whether
the banks had acquired something which would benefit future
economic periods, and if so, whether this circumstance alone required capitalization of the expenditure.
In First Security Bank, the Commissioner argued that the
taxpayers had acquired "several new, separate assets" when they
made the initial payments on the BankAmericard system. 28 Prior
to First Security Bank, however, the Commissioner had insisted
that the initial one-time payments should be capitalized under
section 263 27 because it "provides future economic benefits of an
24. [d.
25. [d. The court found the facts in Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475

F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973), reu'g 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 171 (1972) more persuasive. In Briarcliff,
the taxpayer was a New York candy company. In order to recapture sales lost when people moved to the suburbs, it set up a "franchise" division to make agency and
"franchise" agreements with drugstores and other merchants. The taxpayer deducted its
costs incurred as part of this promotional campaign. The Second Circuit held that taxpayer's expenditures fit clearly within the long-standing principle allowing an ordinary
and necessary expense deduction for costs incurred in protecting an existing investment,
a continuing busine88 or preserving existing income from loss or diminution. [d. at 787
(citations omitted),
26. 592 F.2d at 1052.
27. I.R.C. § 263 (1954) includes "any amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate." Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2 (1958) gives the following examples of capital
expenditures:
(a) The cost of acquisition, construction, or erection of buildings, machinery and equipment, furniture and fixtures, and
similar property having a useful life substantially beyond the
taxable year.
(b) Amounts expended for securing a copyright and plates,
which remain the property of the person making the
payments.
(c) The cost of defending or perfecting title to property.
(d) The amount expended for architect's services.
(e) Commissions paid in purchasing securities. Commissions
paid in selling securities are an offset against the selling price.
except that in the case of dealers in securities such commis-
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unknown duration. "28 The courts gave little weight to the Government's theory 29 and instead embraced the trend which resions may be treated as an ordinary and necessary business
expense.
(0 Amounts assessed and paid under an agreement between
bondholders or shareholders of a corporation to be used in a
reorganization of the corporation or voluntary contributions by
shareholders to the capital of the corporation for any corporate
purpose. Such amounts are capital investments and are not
deductible. See section 118 and § 1.118·1.
(g) A holding company which guarantees dividends at a speci.
fied rate on the stock of a subsidiary corporation for the pur·
pose of securing new capital for the subsidiary and increasing
the value of its stockholdings in the subsidiary shall not de·
duct amounts paid in carrying out this guaranty in computing
its taxable income, but such payments are capital expendi.
tures to be added to the cost of its stock in the subsidiary.
(h) The cost of good will in connection with the acquisition of
the assets of a going concern is a capital expenditure.
28. See First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 413 F. Supp. 1107, 1111 n.5 (D.S.C.
1976), aff'd, 558 F.2d 721; Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d at
1191; First Security Bank v. Commissioner, 664 T.C. at 649. In Iowa·Des Moines Nat'l,
Bank v. United States, 867 T.C. 872, 878 the Government argued that the expenses were
"nonrecurrent and gave rise to assets or secured benefits having an indefinite useful life."
(Emphasis added).
29. The future benefits argument arose out of dicta in Hotel Kingkade v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 310, 312 (lOth Cir. 1950), where the court stated that an expenditure
should be capitalized "if it brings about the acquisition of an asset having a useful life in
excess of one year or if it secures a like advantage to the taxpayer which has a life of
more than one year." This language was repeated verbatim in United States v. Akin, 248
F.2d 742, 744 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 956 (1958). However, in Colorado
Springs, the Tenth Circuit pointed out that the future benefits argument enunciated in
Hotel Kingkade and Akin had been "to serve as a mere guidepost for the resolution of the
ultimate issue, not as an absolute role requiring the automatic capitalization of every
expenditure of providing the taxpayer with a benefit enduring for a period in excess of
one year." 505 F.2d at 1192, quoting United States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686, 689 (lOth Cir.
1968). The court further distinguished all cases which involved "acquisitions of, or improvements to, a distinct and recognizable property interest. Participation in the Master
Charge system has no extrinsic or marketable value. It creates no property right." 505
F.2d at 1192.
At the Tax Court level, the Government in First Security Bank cited the Tenth Circuit cases and three other cases to support its future benefits argument. 63 T.C. 644. Two
cases involved a recognizable intangible asset-Dow Coming Corp. v. Commissioner, 53
T.C. 54 (l969) (costs for use of a trademark) and Radio Station WBrn, Inc. v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 803 (1959) (costs of acquiring a television station license). The third case,
Glenn L. Heigerick v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 475 (1966), involved a physician's payments
for medical staff privileges at a hospital. The Tax Court, however, without much discussion, cited Cubbedge Snow v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 585, 593 (1958):
[Wlhile capital expenditures ordinarily result in the acquisition of assets having periods of useful life in excess of 1 year, it
does not follow that an expenditure must be deemed a capital
outlay merely because the ultimate benefit may accrue in a
year o~ years subsequent to the year or payment.
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ceived its impetus, if not its inception, from the Supreme
Court's asset-creation approach enunciated in Commissioner v.
Lincoln Savings & Loan Association. 30
In Lincoln, the Supreme Court summarized the previous decisions dealing with the meaning of ordinary and necessary expenses and stated: "The principal function of the term 'ordinary'
in section 162(a) is to clarify the distinction, often difficult, between those expenses that are currently deductible and those in
the nature of capital expenditures, which, if deductible at all,
must be amortized over the useful life of the asset."3t The Court
specifically rejected the Government's argument that the "presence of an ensuing benefit that may have some future aspect is
... controlling."32 The Court then enunciated the basic test:
In Cubbedge Snow, the taxpayer attorneys deducted payments made to a savings and
loan which they had started with the explicit objective of promoting an additional source
of legal fees from title searches.
Finally, in the remaining bank credit card cases, Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v.
United States, 68 T.C. 872, 879, and First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 413 F. Supp.
1107, 1112 (D. S.C. 1976), aff'd, 558 F.2d 721, the courts again rejected arid disposed of
the Government's future benefit theory. In Iowa-Des Moines Nat 'I Bank, the Tax Court
held that the "mere presence of some possible future benefit from an expenditure is not
controlling where such payment was made to promote the taxpayer's existing business
and does not create or enhance a separate and distinct asset or property interest." 68
T.C. at 879. In First Nat'l Bank, the Government cited Georator Corp. v. United States,
485 F.2d 283, 285 (4th Cir. 1973) where the Georator court commented: "Nor is it necessary that an expenditure increase the value of an asset in order to be classified as a
capital expenditure . . . . Costs of defending title to property, although adding nothing to
the value of the property, have been held to be capital expenditures." The district court
noted that the Government's reliance on this passage was misconstrued if it was argued
that there need be no asset at all to which items classified as capital expenditures can be
tied. 413 F. Supp. at 1112. It went on to say that Georator involved a definite asset-a
trademark-and was not inconsistent with permitting deduction in full of the bank credit
card start-up costs "where neither party can identify or define any asset upon which
taxpayer's assessment expenditures have had any effect." Id.
30. 403 U.S. 345 (1971). In Lincoln, the taxpayer paid premiums to the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, a corporation created by § 402 of the National
Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1725 (1969). The payments were made to a general reserve and
to a secondary reserve, in which each savings and loan had a pro rata share. It was the
payments to this secondary reserve which the Court held to be non-deductible.
31. Id. at 353, citing Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689-90 (1966).
32. 403 U.S. at 354. In the bank credit card cases, the Government cited United
States v. Mississippi Chemical Corp., 405 U.S. 298 (1972), as authority for its future
benefits test. In Mississippi Chemical, the taxpayer argued that certain payments made
to a farm cooperative established by Congress were, in fact, hidden interest charges and,
therefore, deductible. The Court held that it was a payment for a security interest, stating that "since the security is of value in more than one taxable year, it is a capital
asset . . . . " Id. at 310. The Government's reliance on Mississippi Chemical is misplaced
since the Mississippi Chemical Court devoted its entire analysis on whether or not the
payments were for the purchase of an asset.
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What is important and cl;>ntrolling, we feel, is that
the . . . payment serves to create or enhance for
[the taxpayer] what is essentially a separate and
distinct additional asset and that, as an inevitable
consequence, the payment is capital in nature and
not an expense, let alone an ordinary expense, deductible under § 162(a) in the absence of other
factors not established here. 33

In Briarcliff Candy Company v. Commissioner,34 the Second
Circuit interpreted the Lincoln holding as "[bringing] about a
radical shift in emphasis and directing the inquiry . . . to the
question whether or not [the taxpayer] ha[s] created or enhanced
. . . what was essentially a separate and distinct additional asset."'" The Court noted that prior to 1971, the often repeated and
generally applied standards had been that if an expenditure resulted in agreements or other benefits for a term exceeding one
year, it was not ordinary but capital in nature. sa However, since
the courts have consistently rejected the Government's future
benefits argument,37 the majority view among the federal courts
is the Second Circuit's interpretation of Lincoln. 38
33. 403 U.S. at 354.
34. 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973). See note 25 supra.
35. Id. at 782. One commentator points out that the earlier approach began with an
analysis of deductibility of business costs, by first determining whether the cost was "ordinary" or "nece88ary" under § 162(a). Modernly, the courts first determine whether the
expenditure must be capitalized under § 263. See Note, Market Development Costs: Business Expense or Capital Investment?, 40 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1447, 1449 (1974).
The view that Lincoln represents a radical shift in emphasis is disputed. For a thorough discussion of the subject matter, see Gunn, The Requirement That a Capital Expenditure Create or Enhance an Asset, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 443, 444 (1974).
One commentator views the bank cases as a trend in which the question of deductibility or non-deductibility is resolved along the lines of generally accepted accounting
principles. See, Brown and Lee, Deductibility of Start-Up Expenditures Under Section
162-The "Clear-Reflection-of-Income" Test, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 618, 631-38 (1976).
36. Id. at 782.
37. See the bank credit card cases, note 12 supra; see also note 29 supra and accompanying text.
38. This question does not appear to have been litigated in the First, Third, Fifth,
Sixth or Seventh Circuits. The Court of Claims recently considered whether a company
could deduct the cost of a survey of its oil and gas reserves, stating:
The prior decisions on the tax treatment of the cost of producing surveys said to be comparable to [this] report all seem to
have gone off on the postulate of considering the survey as part
of some underlying property.
In this instance, however, the Government di~avows that approach and asks us to treat the . . . report by itself, as property having a useful life in taxpayer's business lasting beyond
the taxable year . . . .
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Therefore, on appealing First Security Bank to the Ninth
Circuit, the Commissioner chose not to rely on the "future benefits" approach. Instead, the Government argued that the cost
was for purchase of several assets, including the right and license
to use the BankAmericard service marks and distinctive
emblem, promotional materials and a computer program. 3D The
Ninth Circuit, however, affirmed the Tax Court findings that:
(1) the right to use the BankAmericard indicia was not within
the scope of the initial costs paid, since a bank, already possessing the operation know-how and computer programming, would
not have been required to pay the initial fees;40 and (2) there was
nothing to differentiate the promotional materials from other advertising and office supplies which are deductible}·
Two judges on the Ninth Circuit panel were "unable to distinguish between the 'computer costs' involved in the Colorado
Springs case and the amounts paid for a 'computer program' " by
the Idaho and Utah banks.42 Judge Duniway disagreed. 43 He
Our difficulty with that line-of-reasoning is that the [engineer's] report, if "property" is not the kind of property which
should be capitalized by itself, even if its usefulness happens
to last beyond the year in which it is produced. [The] study
was scarcely the sort of "separate and distinct asset" that the
Court in Lincoln Savings & Loan Association . . . found "important and controlling."
Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604, 616-17 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (citations
omitted).
39. 592 F.2d at 1052. This was not the first time that the Commissioner sought to
identify several assets. In Colorado Springs. the district court ruled in favor of the Commissioner that an initial $10,000 membership fee paid to Master Charge was a capital
expenditure. The fee was a one-time, non-refundable payment that could not be separately transferred. The taxpayer did not appeal this ruling. 505 F.2d at 1187-88. Accord.
Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. United States, 68 T.C. 872 (1977), where the Government
argued that payments to a telephone solicitation concern responsible for creating a list of
approved credit customers, similar to a subscription or customers list, were costs which
must be capitalized. The Tax Court disagreed holding that the cost was merely for credit
screening which was an expense normally incurred by the bank. 68 T.C. at 880, aff'd on
this point. 592 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1979).
40. 592 F.2d at 1052.
41. 1d.
42.1d.
43. 1d. at 1053 (Duniway, J. dissenting). It appears that Judge Duniway was correct.
In Colorado Springs. the computer costs were for keypunching and inserting its customer

account data into the computer system, in addition to fees paid for the addition of each
new merchant and cardholaer to the system, as well as a maintenance fee. 505 F.2d at
1187. This would appear to differ from a computer program, which is a set of coded
instructions so that the computer can accept and manipulate the data on a recurring
basis. However, the Tenth Circuit compared the functions of a computer program with
the training of clerks, finding that "[c]omputer charges are recurring just as are clerical
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/15
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compared computer programs to a punched paper music roll
used to activate a player piano. He noted that if a restaurant
owner bought a player piano for his establishment, he would be
required to amortize the cost of the music rolls over their useful
life, whereas, if he paid a musician to play for the diners, the
wages would be ordinary expenses. 44
C.

ANALYSIS

In First Security Bank, the Ninth Circuit, in ruling that initial costs for participating in a national bank credit card system
are deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses, has joined a
marked trend by courts. This trend permits a taxpayer already
engaged in a trade or business to deduct expenses of expanding
markets or new product lines if they are at all related to the
products of services already provided by the going concern. It is
clear, too, that the Ninth Circuit, as well as other courts, are
concerned that if Richmond Television was extended to include
existing businesses, national economic growth and profits might
be inhibited. 45 Illustrating this concern, the district court in First
salaries." [d. at 1191. There is one difference, however. The computer program can be
sold to someone else; the clerk cannot.
44. 592 F.2d at 1053.
45. As the Tenth Circuit in Colorado Springs noted: "The intent to make a future
profit is obvious. Changes in methods of operation often have a direct bearing on costs
and profits . . . . The credit card system takes advantage of modem technology . . . . To
paraphrase the Comptroller [of the Currency], the use of these modern facilities furthers
the objectives of our expanding national economy." 505 F.2d at 1190.
The Government is not likely to prevail in extending Richmond Television to include
existing businesses, except in cases where a taxpayer sets up subsidiaries either in corporate or partnership form. It was recently reported that the
Appeals Office in a District located in the Fourth Circuit is of
the opinion that the Richmond Television case applies where
expansion activities of an ongoing business are conducted by
the use of separately incorporated subsidiaries. In the matter
before the Appeals Office, the taxpayer, a consolidated group,
was engaged in a service-type business, and had multiple operations, each operation conducted by a separately incorporated
subsidiary. It is the position of the Appeals Office that had
taxpayer's activity been conducted by divisions rather than
subsidiaries, preopening expenses would not be at issue.
ABA Section on Taxation, Points to Remember, 32 THE TAX LAWYER 790 (1979).
However, in Baltimore Aircoil Co., Inc. v. United States, 333 F. Supp. 705 (D. Md.
1971), a parent corporation was permitted to deduct certain expenses in connection with
opening a plant for a California subsidiary. The taxpayer filed consolidated returns. The
Commissioner argued that "the trade or business of [the California subsidiary was] not
the trade or business of Aircoil since they [were] separate and distinct entities, each engaged in separate, though similar, trades or businesses. The Government argued that the
payments by Aircoil are capital contributions. . . ." [d. at 709. The court, applying the
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National Bank prefaced its discussion of this issue by noting

that "[t]he vital role which bank credit cards play in modern
American Society is unquestionably a property subject for judicial notice. "46
The courts have also been reluctant to adopt a future benefits test, as promulgated by the Commissioner, especially where
the taxpayer is not permitted to amortize the costs that are capitalized. As the Tenth Circuit stated in Colorado Springs:
We do not know how the useful life of the asset,
which the government says was acquired, would
be determined. The government insists that the
point is immaterial because we are not concerned
with amortization . . . . The government's theoretical approach ignores the practicalities of the
situation, and permits a distortion of taxpayer's
financial situation. If an expenditure, concededly
of temporal value, may be neither expensed nor
amortized, the adoption of technological advances
is discouraged.· 7
"substance over form" doctrine in favor of the taxpayer found that the California subsidiary was a "mere branch or division" of the parent. [d. at 771.
But see Madison Gas & Elec. Co., [19791 TAX CT. REp. DEC. (P-H) 72-284, where an
electric utility was denied deduction of the cost of training nuclear plant employees
where the nuclear power plant was to be conducted through a joint venture with other
employees. The Government relied on Richmond Television; the taxpayer relied on Baltimore Aircoil. The court distinguished the utility's position from that in Baltimore Aircoil
on the ground that the utility did not wholly own the nuclear power plant and that economic realities necessitated the need for joint ventures. [d. at 72-309.
46. 413 F. Supp. at 1110. A footnote, however, points out that "[t]he astronomical
balances and resulting interest charges which some cardholders inflict upon themselves
lead the court to question whether the cards are a boon to the consumer as well as to the
banks. In retrospect, to those of a more conservative philosophy, bankcards are immoral
for encouraging debt, sometimes reckless debt." [d. at 1110 n.4.
47. 505 F.2d at 119? This sentiment echoes that of the Second Circuit in Briarcliff
where the court remarked that "it [was] anybody's guess" as to what intangible assets
were deductible. 475 F.2d at 782. The court stated:
The interpretation and application of the statutes and regulations with regard to tangibles in deciding whether a particular
expenditure is for repairs or for a capital addition or improvement are sometimes difficult, but guidelines have been established which give a taxpayer clues as to what is correct and
what is not.
In the realm of intangibles, however, the rulings and decisions
are in a state of hopeless confusion particularly where the issue
concerns an intangible contribution . . . to an intangible asset. . . . Many decisions in this area rest upon administrative
fiat, fortified by the requirement that the taxpayer show clear
error . . . . The taxpayer, who may be exposed to interest and
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The Government's position, extended to its logical conclusion,
would require the capitalization of nearly all costs of a business,
because they are incurred to create or enhance a valuable intangible asset-goodwill, which is the sum total of the preservation
and improvement of existing income. 48
The courts have also found it difficult to find some distinct
guidelines to simplify the determination of what expenses are ordinary, particularly where no tangible asset or clearly identifiable intangible asset is involved. However, the bank cases indicate that courts believe, that because of Lincoln, they have
found some ground with which they are familiar in rendering
federal income tax decisions. The Supreme Court's test requiring
a "distinct and recognizable property interest" has been the
touchstone. 49
The courts in the bank cases have mentioned several factors
which would have to be present in order to find that such a property interest exists. Foremost is that the "thing" should be
saleable, 50 transferrable,5! or have a marketable value. 52 Other
qualities courts mention include an "asset from which [the taxpayer can] . . . recoup assessments, "53 that has "intrinsic
value,"54 amounts to "a property right,"55 is something "corporeal"58 and non-"recurring."57 Thus, it would appear that if the
penalties for guessing wrong, is entitled to reasonably clear criteria or standards to let him know what his rights and duties
are.
[d. at 785.

Generally the costs of most intangible assets are not amortized. However, a few exceptions have been permitted. Organization expenditures of a corporation (IRe § 248)
and the costs of developing newspaper or magazine circulation (§ 173) may be amortized
over a period of not less than 60 months. In 1956, Congress amended the Code to permit
6O-month amortization for trademarks (IRC § 177), and organizational costs of partnerships. (IRC § 709).
48. Goodwill cannot be amortized. Treas. Reg. 1-167(a)(3).
49. Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. at 355.
50. First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 558 F.2d at 723, Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank
v. United States, 505 F.2d at 1192; Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. United States, 68
T.e. at 878.
51. First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 558 F.2d at 723.
52. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d at 1192.
53. First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 558 F.2d at 723.
54. [d.
55. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d at 1192.
56. [d.
57. [d. See also First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 413 F. Supp. at 1112; Iowa-Des
Moines Nat'l Bank v. United States, 68 T.e. at 879. The criteria mentioned conform to
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Service is to prevail in future cases, it will have to be able to
articulate the asset which has been created or enhanced. Indeed,
it has already begun to do so, with success. 58
Taxpayers, on the other hand, will need to structure their
arrangements so that the expenditures are closely related to
usual and recurring expenses, rather than the acquisition of a
property right. An example of successful structuring can be seen
in the BankAmericard contracts entered into by the Idaho and
Utah banks. The initial one-time fees were apportioned among
various services and supplies which the banks were to receive. 59
However, some Master Charge contracts, which did not apportion the costs of the initial payment, were held to be membership fees which must be capitalized. eo

D.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit, in its brief and conclusionary opinion in
First Security Bank, has incorporated a number of cases, the
weight of which will inure to the benefit of those taxpayers who
are planning to make expenditures to expand their business,
enter new fields or adopt new methods. In so doing, it is likely
they will prevail against the Government in deducting those
costs unless a recognizable intangible asset is involved.
Helen Rowland Martin
the opinion of the Second Circuit, which noted that § 263(a) could apply to intangible
assets "provided they have an ascertainable and measurable value in money's worth, so
that they are no longer regarded as an expense but as a distinct and recognized property
interest." Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d at 785 (2d Cir. 1973).
58. See Madison Gas & Elec. Co., [1979) TAX CT. REp. DEC. (P·H) 72·284; Jack's
Cookie Co. v. United States, 597 F.2d 395 (1979) (reserve payments in monthly rental
payments made to a governmental agency, placed in a fund required by bond agree·
ments, must be capitalized).
59. First Security Bank v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. at 646, 647 n.9.
SO. Colorado Springs NaCI Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d at 1187. Iowa·Des
Moines Nat'l Bank v. United States, 68 T.C. at 880·81. In First NaCI Bank v. United
States, 558 F.2d 721, the banks were members of a non·profit corporation formed to es·
tablish a computerized system under Master Charge. There was no stock and no stock·
holders. The bank members had no interest in the assets, and upon dissolution of the
corporation, all of its net assets were to be paid to a tax·exempt organization. The
members' initial fees were specifically for costs of the organization and were computed
in a manner similar to the monthly recurring charges. [d. at 723.
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OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN TAX

In Bing Crosby Productions v. United States, 588 F.2d 1293
(9th Cir. Jan., 1979), the court examined whether motion picture
and television films and tapes q~alify for an investment tax
credit. The court held that the master negatives and intermediate printing articles qualified for investment tax credit. The
court also held that as long as property is located within the
United States for 50% of the year, its predominant use is considered to be within the United States.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. General Telephone Co.,
594 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. Jan., 1979), a telephone customer
brought suit against the telephone company seeking to recover
excise taxes paid on telephone services. The district court
granted the telephone company's motion for summary judgment
and the customer appealed. The court of appeals, adopting a
Second Circuit holding, held that the Excise Tax Reduction Act
of 1965 did not impose any duty on the telephone company to
separate charges for private branch exchange services from
charges for normal telephone services in its bills to the customer,
and therefore left the billing practices within the utility's
discretion.
In Wood v. United States, 590 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. Jan.,
1979), a taxpayer brought suit to recover income taxes paid on a
lump sum received upon termination of employment due to disability. The taxpayer's company plan included both a profit sharing funded retirement plan and disability coverage. The court
noted that the nature and taxable status of a payment must be
determined by the event that triggers payment. Since the payment was made on the basis of disability, the court held that the
lump sum was excludable from income.
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